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Director, Center for
Dietrich Earnhart has been with the Institute since July 2000.
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1995
M.S., University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1991
B.A., Yale University, 1987
Dietrich Earnhart's Vita (PDF format)
Dietrich Earnhart teaches environmental economics, resource economics, comparative economics, and research methods at the University of Kansas. His research focuses on environmental economic issues especially those involving legal dimensions, such as optimal strategies for enforcing environmental protection laws, the effects of regulatory factors on corporate and municipal environmental performance, the effect of professional peer comparisons on environmental compliance, policies to induce energy and water conservation, and efforts to reduce food waste.
Law and Economics
"Use of Competitive Endogenous Audit Mechanisms by Federal and State Inspectors within Environmental Protection Agencies,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, forthcoming (with Lana Friesen).
“Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment,” Environmental and Resource Economics, v. 78, n. 2, pg. 227-255, 2020, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00530-0 (with Lana Friesen).
The Effect of Peer Comparisons on Polluters: A Randomized Field Experiment among Wastewater Dischargers,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 1-26, 2020, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00522-0 (with Paul Ferraro).
“The Effectiveness of a Water Right Retirement Program at Conserving Water,” Land Economics, v. 96, n. 1, pg. 56-74, 2020 (with Tsvetan Tsvetanov).
“Effect of Cooperative Enforcement Strategies on Wastewater Management,” Economic Inquiry, v. 56, n. 2 [April], pg. 1357-1379, 2018 (with Zach Raff).
“The Role of Regulated Facilities’ Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Regulatory Monitoring and Enforcement: Compliance with the Clean Water Act,” Ecological Economics, 142, pg. 282-294, 2017 (with Lana Friesen).
“Effective Regulatory Stringency’ and Firms’ Profitability: The Effects of Effluent Limits and Government Monitoring,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, v. 50, n. 2, pg. 111-145, 2016 (with Dylan Rassier).